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LETTERS TO THE EDITORRegarding “Withdrawal of article by the FDA after
objection from Medtronic”
As one of the authors of the paper “Aneurysm-related mortal-
ity rates in the US AneuRx clinical trial,” which was accepted for
publication and then withdrawn by the FDA under threat of legal
action from Medtronic, I write to respond to the issues raised by
the Cronenwett and Seeger editorial (J Vasc Surg 2004;40:209-
10). In a letter to the FDA, Medtronic claimed that the outcomes
data used were “proprietary information” protected as confiden-
tial. In fact, the data were used in the FDA’s AneuRx Public Health
Notice dated December 17, 2003, making the information public,
and the manuscript had been cleared by the FDA’s Freedom of
Information Office as containing neither proprietary nor protected
health information. Medtronic was also concerned that we had
used the predicted mortality rate of 1% to 2% from open repair to
show that the cumulative aneurysm-related death rate following
use of the AneuRx graft would exceed that of open repair after the
second year of follow-up. In fact, the evidence supports this
conclusion, showing that the rate of mortality in the AneuRx
patients does not decline with time. Previous published studies
justify using the 2% open mortality rate for high-volume institu-
tions for comparison, especially since the AneuRx cohort excluded
patients with serious comorbidities such as renal failure, obesity,
ASA above level IV, and aortoiliac occlusive disease. The question
of whether the mortality rate in AneuRx patients actually increases
with time is a valid concern since the trend in the data was not
statistically significant. This could be answered by additional data
held by the company since the information submitted to the FDA
did not go beyond October, 2002.
Of most concern is the response of FDA administration, which
failed to support its own investigators after evidence that there was
no merit in the company’s complaints. This study belongs in the
leading vascular journal so that it can be debated nationally and
internationally. Just as patients still die from pulmonary embolism
after placement of a Greenfield filter, patients are dying from aneu-
rysm rupture after placement of stent grafts. It does not mean that
either technology is inappropriate treatment. Instead, users of these
medical devices and their patients should be fully informed of their
associated risks. Inability to publish this manuscript will have a chilling
effect on further critical investigation at the FDA, and could under-
mine the confidence of physicians and the public in its objectivity.
Lazar J. Greenfield, MD
Professor of Surgery
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Mich
doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2004.07.014
Inappropriate industry influence on FDA processes
The recent withdrawal by the FDA of a peer-reviewed manu-
script concerning the AneuRx stent graft as a result of legal
pressure from industry is an alarming episode that should trouble
all health care providers as well as the public at large. As reported in
the 9 July 2004 Wall Street Journal, the FDA made this request
under direct threat of litigation by Medtronic after the accepted
article, which included publicly available information, had initially
appeared on the Journal of Vascular Surgery Web site. The mission
statement of the FDA notes that it performs “. . .high quality,
science-based work that results in maximizing consumer protec-
tion.” For the past 15 years, I have voluntarily served as a consul-
tant to the Circulatory Devices Panel of the FDA and have had the
privilege of working with many FDA employees who are incredibly
dedicated, hard-working public servants of unquestioned ethics,594who strive to carry out that mission every day of their professional
lives. I continue to have nothing but the utmost respect for their
service. My concern is with the political leadership of the FDA. It
is unacceptable that this mission should be compromised by extra-
neous pressure to impede the dissemination of information. What
is particularly disconcerting is that the episode depicted in the Wall
Street Journal article is strikingly similar to an experience I have had
recently with the FDA.
I had been invited to participate in the FDA Circulatory
Devices carotid stent panel meeting in April 2004 concerning the
SAPPHIRE carotid stent trial data. I felt well qualified to partici-
pate in this deliberation in light of my long-standing interest in
carotid artery disease. Although I believe that carotid endarterec-
tomy is the best treatment for the majority of patients with carotid
disease, I believe carotid stenting is appropriate for truly high-risk
patients and have recommended this in my practice. My public
position on these issues, including the SAPPHIRE trial, was well
known to the leadership of the Circulatory Devices panel prior to
my inclusion on the carotid stent panel. Over the last 15 years of
service that I have provided to the FDA, there never has been a
question of my commitment to a fair, ethical, and unbiased assess-
ment of the data presented to our panel meetings. However,
somewhat inexplicably, just a few weeks prior to the carotid stent
panel meeting, I was called by the leadership of the Circulatory
Devices section and informed that I was being dropped from the
panel because of my public commentary concerning carotid stent-
ing. After I wrote a strongly worded letter of protest, and empha-
sized that my public statements on the issue were well known to
the FDA prior to my selection for the panel, I was explicitly told by
an individual at the highest level of leadership in the Devices
Section that “if I were allowed to participate, and if the carotid
stent device under consideration were not approved, the FDA
would be sued by the industry sponsor.” It was clear that I had
been eliminated on the basis of pressure from industry, in this case
Cordis, Inc. I was, needless to say, dumbfounded, but in light of the
recent AneuRx manuscript withdrawal, perhaps I should not have
been. The FDA had apparently reacted on the basis of a fear of
litigation, as subsequently was the case with the AneuRx article. It
appeared to me that the FDA leadership had caved to pressure from
those it was supposed to regulate, and this is absolutely unacceptable.
While FDA personnel have always and must continue to work
closely with industry in the design and evaluation of device trials, it
appears that the leadership of the FDA has recently yielded exces-
sive control of that regulatory process to the industry that it is
supposed to regulate, and this is wrong. Suppression of the publi-
cation of trial data, positive or negative; preventing the communi-
cation of information that consumers and health care providers
need to make informed judgments; and undue control, including
veto power, over who can most effectively support the regulatory
function of our government in assessing medical device and phar-
maceutical scientific studies is intolerable, and will ultimately be
detrimental to all stakeholders in the system, and most importantly
our patients. The public interest should be our moral compass.
Bruce A. Perler, MD, MBA
Chief, Vascular Surgery
The Johns Hopkins Hospital
Baltimore, Md
doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2004.07.015
Misperceptions regarding the long-term safety of the
AneuRx stent graft
On July 9, 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that an
article posted on the Journal of Vascular Surgery Web site was
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Volume 40, Number 3 Letters to the Editor 595withdrawn from publication by the FDA as a result of lobbying by
Medtronic.1 According to the Wall Street Journal, this article
“raised concerns about the long term safety record of a device”
which was the subject of a Public Health Notification (PHN) by
the FDA in December 2003.2 We regret that the article will not be
published for it would provide an opportunity to examine evidence
upon which clinical practice decisions may be based. We hope that
this letter will provide information on the long-term safety of the
AneuRx stent graft that can be weighed against the FDA PHN and
media interpretations.
In the PHN, the FDA reported its analysis of 942 patients
treated with the AneuRx stent graft and found a 30-day abdominal
aortic aneurysm (AAA) death rate of 1.5%, with 8 late AAA deaths
during 3 follow-up years. The cumulative AAA death rate was 2.7%
at 3 years,2 which was lower than the 3.1% AAA death rate reported
for all 1193 patients treated during the AneuRx clinical trial,3 due
to exclusion of high-risk patients from the FDA analysis. It was also
lower than the 3% to 5% operative mortality for surgery, which the
FDA found in the literature.2 However, rather than reassuring
patients with these good results, the FDA suggested that “the risk
of late AAA-related mortality associated with AneuRx may exceed
that associated with open surgery [and] the overall AAA-associ-
ated mortality from the AneuRx Stent Graft is likely to cross-over
and exceed the AAA-associated mortality from open surgery at
some point in time.”2 How could the FDA arrive at this remarkable
conclusion? Perhaps the supporting data appear in the “squelched”
article, and these needs to be published.
From our reading of the PHN, it appears the FDA assumed
that operative mortality for surgery is 1% to 2%, that late AAA death
rate is 0.18% per year (as opposed to 0.4% per year for AneuRx),
and that late adverse events for both increase linearly with time. We
find little data to support these assumptions. There is, however,
actual data with Kaplan-Meier analysis extending to 5 years for all
1193 AneuRx clinical trial patients.4 How do the FDA’s projec-
tions compare to these actual data? Since the FDA excluded
high-risk patients, we excluded the 262 high-risk patients in the
trial, leaving 931 patients, very similar to the 942 patients studied
by the FDA. The AAA death rates for these 931 patients at 30 days
and 1 to 5 years are as follows: 1.5%, 1.5%, 1.8%, 1.9%, 2.5%, and
2.5% (Kaplan-Meier analysis). Thus far, there have been no AAA
deaths beyond 4 years, suggesting that AAA death for AneuRx
patients does not increase linearly with time. Using the FDA’s
estimate of 0.18% per year, and assuming operative mortality rates
of 2% and 5% at 5 years, the AAA death rate for surgery would be
2.9% and 5.9%, both higher than the actual 2.5% 5-year AAA death
rate for AneuRx. Thus, evidence for a late “cross-over” of results is
lacking.
We call for publication of the article containing the evidence
upon which the FDA has made practice-based recommendations
in its PHN so that patients and physicians can judge the evidence
and select the best treatment option.
Christopher K. Zarins
Professor of Surgery
Stanford University
Stanford, Calif
Daniel A. Bloch
Professor of Biostatistics
Stanford University
Stanford, Calif
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Regarding “Carotid endarterectomy in SAPPHIRE-
eligible high-risk patients: Implications for selecting
patients for carotid angioplasty and stenting”
A recent article by Mozes and associates (J Vasc Surg 2004;
39:958-965) seeks to compare 2 groups of patients who under-
went carotid endarterectomy at a single institution over a 5-year
period. These 2 groups were defined as high risk and low risk,
ostensibly on the basis of the eligibility criteria of the high-risk
SAPPHIRE randomized trial of stenting versus endarterectomy.
The reference that the authors quote, however, is not from the
SAPPHIRE trial. Rather, the high-risk criteria were extracted from
an article by Jordan and colleagues.1
That aside, the authors aptly concluded that endarterectomy
can be performed in high-risk patients with acceptable risks of
stroke and death. The question of whether carotid stenting should
be considered in such high-risk patients, however, cannot be
resolved by a comparison of outcome in high- and low-risk pa-
tients. Rather, this question is best answered through a random-
ized comparison of stenting and endarterectomy, either in lower-
risk patients (eg, the CREST trial) or higher-risk patients (eg,
SAPPHIRE).
The authors reasoned that similar results with endarterectomy
in high-risk versus lower-risk patients raise questions about the
appropriateness of stenting as an alternative to endarterectomy.
But the authors’ own data document a mortality rate of 0.6% in
high-risk patients versus 0.0% in low-risk patients (P  .11, calcu-
lated with the 2 test and from their data). When the high-risk
subgroups were compared with lower-risk subgroups, the stroke
rate was 1.9% versus 1.1% (P .45), the frequency of perioperative
myocardial infarction was 3.1% versus 0.9% (P .03), and the rate
of the composite stroke and death myocardial infarction was 9.3%
versus 1.6% (P .000001). For each end point, the point estimates
were higher in the high-risk patients. While some end points did
not achieve statistical superiority, the failure to detect statistical
superiority does not exclude an end point with conviction. Said
another way, the P value of .11 suggests that we are “only” 89%
certain that the mortality rate was greater in the high-risk patients.
Although the SAPPHIRE data have not yet appeared in the
literature, the data presented to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion panel this April suggested that the results of stenting were
equivalent or superior to endarterectomy.2 The demonstration of
non-inferiority of stenting is all that will be required for patients to
preferentially choose a procedure that avoids a neck incision.
Vascular surgeons appear best-equipped to care for patients
with carotid disease: they understand the anatomy, the indications
for intervention, and the necessity for long-term follow-up. We can
choose to become proficient at carotid stenting and be able to offer
it as one potential treatment option. Alternatively, we can discount
this new modality, but we will risk relinquishing the responsibility
for carotid diagnosis and treatment to other specialty groups who
may be unaccustomed to caring for patients with cerebrovascular
disease.
Kenneth Ouriel, MD
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
Cleveland, Ohio
